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ney's memoranda. The former is self-explanatory. The latter may be illustrated
by the case of a railroad worker who is killed on the job late at night with no
witnesses present and immediately thereafter the railroad company's attorneys
make a complete investigation on the spot. The representative of the deceased,
having few facts on which to base a case, would presumably be justified in seeking discovery of the facts contained in the memoranda and reports written by
the railroad's attorneys. Since potential plaintiffs of the type described can only
guess at the factual content of such material, it would be otherwise virtually impossible for them to prove hardship or injustice. Possibly a third valid justification, not mentioned by the Court, would be that the discoveree's answers to
other interrogatories are evasive or dishonest. Another possible justification
might be that a witness' statement taken immediately after an accident is more
likely to be spontaneous and complete than one taken much later.3O One possible
justification which the Supreme Court's opinion definitely eliminates is that
the attorney seeking discovery merely wants the material for a last minute
check to make sure that he has overlooked nothing which may be helpful to his
case. What further possible justifications may be held sufficient under the
Hickman decision are a matter of conjecture.
Taxation-State Gross Receipts Tax-Receipts from Interstate Sale of
Securities Not Taxable-[United States].-The plaintiff, an Indiana resident
and trustee of a testamentary trust, instructed his Indiana broker to sell certain
of the trust securities. When purchaserswere found through offer of the securities
on the New York Stock Exchange by the broker's New York correspondents,
the latter informed the plaintiff's Indiana broker, who transmitted the securities
by mail to New York. The New York brokers received the purchase price from
the customers on delivery of the securities, and remitted the proceeds less their
commissions and expenses to the Indiana broker, who deducted his commissions
and delivered the balance to the plaintiff. The plaintiff paid the New York stock
transfer tax on these transactions. On the gross receipts of these sales, amounting to $65,214.20, the plaintiff paid under protest a fiduciary gross income tax
of i per cent under the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933. z

This act exempts "so much of such gross income as is derived from business
conducted in commerce between this state and other states of the United States
....but only to the extent to which the state of Indiana is prohibited from tax30The same district court which rendered the decision in the Hickman case, in granting
discovery in a later case, grounds its view ....upon the proposition that the statement of a
witness taken immediately after the accident, on the spot as it were, is a catalyst of unique
value in the development of the truth through the judicial process. If this is so (and I believe
that any experienced trial judge would agree that it is), then every consideration of the efficient
working of that process, as well as fairness, requires that it be available to both parties, no
matter which one obtained it." DeBruce v. Pennsylvania R. Co., iSL.W. 2504 (D.C. Pa.,
1947).

xInd. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §§ 54-26oi-64-2632.
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ing such gross income by the Constitution of the United States.' 2 In a suit for
recovery, the Indiana Supreme Court, reversing the court below, sustained the
tax on the grounds that the situs of intangibles is the domicile of the owner, and
that the transaction was not interstate commerce, but only- incidentally and
immaterially involved interstate commerce.3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, held, three justices dissenting, that constitutionally the transaction was interstate commerce, no less because its subject was securities rather
than tangible property, and that the tax was unconstitutional as a "direct imposition" on that commerce. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge
urged that the Court's reasoning should stem from an examination of the danger
of multiple taxation, because invalidation of the tax regardless of "discriminatory consequences or actual or probable impeding effect in fact" constituted a
return to a repudiated doctrine. Freeman v. Hewit.4
The decision in this case, although in accord with the results of recent grossreceipts-tax litigation before the Court,s injects confusion into the field of state
taxation of interstate commerce by apparently abandoning the multiple-burden
test enunciated by Mr. Justice Stone in Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue.6
This formula was applied in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,7 involving the same Indiana statute, and distinguishable from the present case only in the tangible
nature of the subject of sale. 8 Mr. Justice Rutledge objects to the substitution of
the concepts "direct" and "indirect" burdens on interstate commerce for the
more functional analysis embodied in the multiple-burden test, 9 because the
2Ibid.,

at § 64-26o6(a).

3Hewit v. Freeman,

221 Ind. 675, 5i N.E. 2d 6 (1943).
167 S. Ct. 274 (1946).
s Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,
305 U.S. 434 (I938); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 46 (1946).
6

Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1936):

"....

local taxes, measured

by gross receipts from interstate commerce, have often been pronounced unconstitutional. The
vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid is that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable, in point of substance, of being imposed or
added to with equal right by every state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it would
bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce." See Morrison, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 727 (1942).
7304

U.S. 307 (1938).

8 The Court found that the intangible character of the subject of sale did not distinguish
the instant case from the Adams case. Although the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions all assume that the transaction under scrutiny was interstate commerce, the point
apparently did not seem beyond argument to the Court in a previous memorandum decision
on the instant case, 66 S. Ct. i9 (1945), in which counsel were requested, on reargument, to
address themselves, inter alia, to the question: "Were the sales of securities as made in the circumstances of this case, including the transactions upon the New York Stock Exchange, interstate sales within the meaning of [the Adams case]?" In the appellee's brief on petition for rehearing, the appellee concedes the interstate character of the transaction and shifts his major
argument to the effects of the tax.
9 67 S.Ct. 274, 281-82 (1946).
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result is to cast doubt on the validity of the many direct state taxes which already have passed muster before the Court.1° Seemingly, fairly apportioned
gross-receipts taxes, hitherto approved, would be condemned by a logical extension of the majority opinion in the instant case.
Since 1887, the Court has made important inroads on the doctrine of Robbins
v. Shelby County Taxing District--that"interstate commerce cannot be taxed
at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce
or that which is carried on solely within the state. 2 Thus, the net earnings of
enterprises, although wholly derived from interstate commerce, are taxable by
those states possessing sufficient connections with the subject of the tax on the
theory that a general, uniform, net income tax is only an indirect burden on interstate commerce. 3 Similarly, property used in interstate commerce may be
taxed by the measure of gross earnings found to be earned within the state when
the tax is levied expressly in lieu of a property tax, on the ground that such a
tax is not a tax on gross earnings.4
But the Court has consistently refused to permit taxation of unapportioned
gross receipts from interstate commerce. Until 1938, this refusal usually took
the form of a prohibition on what were found to be direct burdens on interstate
commerce, whether the tax was on gross receipts as such,5 or on the privilege of
6
engaging in a business measured by the gross receipts from the business.
In 1938, however, the Court in the Western Livestock case substituted the
multiple-burden test for the direct-burden test and concerned itself with the
practical question of how much a tax actually obstructed the commerce. It
would appear that this new test was at least in part based on a recognition of the
virtual subsidy granted to large areas of interstate commerce at the expense of
local commerce by the Court's limitations on state taxing power, and of the de10Fourteen states have filed motions for leave to file a brief amici curiae, arguing that if the
standards laid down in the Adams and related cases have in fact been abandoned in the Freeman case, state tax administrators are without a guide for the future.

U.S. 489 (1887).
Tbid., at 497r3 United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918). The difficulties of
administration of a net income tax, well demonstrated in federal experience, together with the
manifold opportunities for manipulating profit and loss statements, would seem to militate
against the use of this sanctioned device. The taxpayer's volume of business probably bears
a closer relation to the cost of governmental services furnished than does his net income. See
"120
12

York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 3o3 U.S. 573 (1938).
14 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (i918).
Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1883).
,6 Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (i917). But cf. American Mfg. Co. v.
'5

St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (rgig), sustaining as only an indirect burden a tax on the privilege of
manufacturing, measured by the gross receipts, as was the tax in the Crew Levick case, though
the Court found the latter "so obviously distinguishable that particular analysis is unnecessary." See Traynor, State Taxation and the Commerce Clause in the Supreme Court, x938
Term, 28 Calif. L. Rev. x68 (i94o).
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mands by the states for contribution from that commerce unless there was a
showing by the taxpayer of the kind of discrimination at which the commerce
clause was directed. This new approach coincided with widespread adoption by
the states of new means to raise urgently needed revenues, among the most im7
portant of which were sales and use taxes.
The decisions of the Court during the past decade in the field of sales and use
taxes, which levies appear to differ significantly in their effects on interstate
commerce from so-called gross-receipts taxes chiefly in the manner of collection, 8 have weakened the multiple-burden rationale through the anomaly of
sanctioning sales and use taxes on the same interstate transaction as a means of
makinginterstate commerce pay its way. In the typical case the state of entrance
has been permitted to levy a tax on the "privilege of using" tangible personal
property, equivalent in amount to its sales tax, on articles entering the state in
pursuance of an interstate sale.' 9 Although all use-tax states credit their own
sales tax, if paid (since the purpose of the use tax is to compensate for out-ofstate purchases not subject to the sales tax), the majority do not credit sales
taxes paid in other states. 0 If two taxes can thus be imposed on a single sale, the
cumulative burden is apparent. The Court has dealt with objections to this
situation in two ways. In contradiction to the orthodox statement of the multiple-burden test, it has intimated first that the mere "risk" of cumulative impositions on interstate commerce is not enough to condemn use taxes," although the
exaction of a use tax without the crediting clause would seem to be within the
precise ban of the Court's decisions in the gross receipts cases. In addition, the
Court has proceeded to divide integral interstate transactions into "local incidents" of use" and delivery,23 thus achieving nominal adherence to the position
Guide Serv.
60-02o and 6o-o5o (1946).
1SSee Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes, 53 Harv. L. Rev. gg, gi( i94o).
17C.C.H. State Tax

19 'Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. i67 (1939) (railroad supplies purchased

outside taxing state; no credit allowed for other sales taxes paid); Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co.,

300

U.S. 577 (1937) (credit allowed for own or other sales tax, if paid).

20C.C.H.

State Tax Guide Serv.

6o-300-63-050 (1946). See also Brown, The Future

of Use Taxes, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 495, 498-99 (1941).
21Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937): "We have
not meant to imply by anything said in this opinion that allowance of a credit for other taxes
paid to Washington made it mandatory that there should be a like allowance of a credit for
taxes paid to other states. A state, for many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-contained unit,
which may frame its own system of burdens and exemptions without heeding systems elsewhere. If there are limits to that power, there is no need to mark them now. It will be time
enough to mark them when a taxpayer paying in the state of origin is compelled to pay again
in the state of destination."
-Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939).
23 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (194o). Mr. Justice Rutledge, who joined the majority in sustaining the New York City sales tax in this case, took
occasion, however, in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423 (1946) to condemn the
argument that solicitation was, like delivery in the Berwind-White case, a local incident.
"There is no known limit to the human mind's capacity to carve out from what is an entire
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that multiple taxation of the "same" event is prohibited. Apparently, this highly conceptual view of a "transaction" in the sales- and use-tax cases has the
effect i)of forcing states at their peril to determine in advance whether the
Court will decide that they have labeled a tax by the approved name and thus
are qualified as tax collectors on the approved local incident, regardless of the
actual economic incidence of the tax,'24 and 2) of creating a Iogical basis for multiple-state taxation of interstate sales through theories disclaiming the imposition
2
of cumulative burdens while having the effect of actually imposing them. S
Discussion in recent cases indicates that the conceptual distinctions and dialectic used in the sales- and use-tax cases and in the instant case take on meaning only as methods by which the Court is seeking to make the practical judgment as to whether interstate commerce is in fact being placed at competitive
disadvantage as compared with local commerce.!6 Since the multiple-burden rationale has been found wanting in making this practical determination in the
sales- and use-tax cases, and since it is not the basis of the decision in the Freeman case, apparently the Court has repudiated the multiple-burden test. It
would appear that this test has furnished a pragmatic working basis in the grossreceipts cases for judicial reconciliation of competing necessities in widely varying fact situations, and that the direct-indirect burden test used in the Freeman
case is inadequate because it obscures the Court's objection to the tax and apparently is not governed by economic considerations. The decision does not purport to search for or discover an impediment to interstate commerce, nor does it
set any standard by which such impeding effect may be measured. Whether actual payment by the plaintiff of the New York tax, or the mere possibility of its
imposition, or neither, render the disputed levy nugatory is left unanswered by
the majority opinion.
or integral economic process particular phases or incidents, label them as 'separate and distinct' or 'local' and thus achieve its desired result." See The Multiple Burden Theory in Interstate Commerce Taxation, 4o Col. L. Rev. 653 (194o).
24In McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (I944), the respondent, a Tennessee corporation
not authorized to do business in Arkansas, obtained orders from buyers in that state. These
orders were accepted in Tennessee, and title passed and delivery was made in Tennessee. It
was held that Arkansas could not levy a "sales" tax on this transaction, though it was strongly
implied that a "use" tax would have met a kinder fate. Ibid., at 330. On the same day, in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), the Court, on sub-

stantially identical facts, sustained the "use" tax of Iowa, the buyer's state. See the special

opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in 322 U.S. 349 (I944) concerning both of the above cases.
2In O'Kane v. State, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E. 2d 9o5 (i94o), noted in 9 Duke B.A. J. 54
(1941), both the majority and the dissenters relied on the multiple burden theory. The court
sustained a New York stock-transfer tax on an agreement for the sale of securities in interstate commerce. The majority found that the making of a contract of sale in New York was an
event which could not recur elsewhere, and that the possibility of cumulative taxes was

therefore absent. Mr. Chief justice Lehman dissented on the authority of the Adams case,

pointing out that the states of destination had the same right to tax the transfer as New
York.
26 This premise, implicit in most of the decisions in this field, is clearly stated in the majority opinion in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 48 (i94o).
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It has been suggested that rough equality of competitive advantage, taxwise
between local and out-of-state sellers is best achieved by permitting only the
buyer's state to tax, since a taxing seller's state cannot reach into a buyer's state
to equalize the burden.2 7This impedes the flow of interstate commerce only to

the extent to which there is a decreased demand in the buyer's state as a result
of the tax, to which, however, all other similar transactions in the latter state
are also subject. Another proposal has been the apportionment of taxes among
the states involved in the transaction, a doubtful solution in view of the lack of
uniformity in state allocation formulas. 28 In this connection a possible new line
of departure is suggested in the dissent of Justices Douglas and Murphy. While
apportionment in this field historically has been a process of estimating the comparative amount of protection, or service, furnished by the state to the interstate activity, the dissenters suggest that a more significant splitting up of interstate transactions is achieved by eliminating from the subject of taxation
the only proceeds really derived from the transaction as an interstate transaction. Thus, in the Freemancase, the Indiana tax was not levied on the brokers' commissions, since the "gross" proceeds taxed did not include these sums.
The rationale of the dissenters seems to be that by eliminating the service of
procuring the interstate transaction, what is left is a subject of taxation which
only by geographical accident and not design has crossed a state line. The reasoning would appear to be questionable in its apparent assumption that by
eliminating the carrier's or procurer's proceeds, the remainder of the process is
somehow divested of its interstate flavor. But insofar as this approach manifests
a desire to inquire into the economics of the situation by asking whether a tax
on the proceeds less the commissions really burdens interstate commerce, it
is reinforced by those cases whose rationale is defended by Mr. Justice Rutledge.29 Until the majority is again willing to base its decision in these cases on
the grounds of practical results, it would seem that the dissenters' suggestion
will have no effect in the determination of future cases.
Whatever the methods used to achieve a balance between the relative responsibilities of local and interstate commerce for the financial support of state
governments, no equitable result can be reached without an attempt to analyze
the actual incidence and effects of various taxes; this attempt is not made in the
Freeman case.
27 This solution takes on special significance in the instant case. If only the few states having major securities markets are permitted to tax the sale of securities in transactions like this
one, a considerable area of potential taxation is declared outside the scope of state power. See
8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 132 (194o), noting O'Kane v. State, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E. 2d 9o5 (1940).
28 Effective apportionment requires study and action on a national scale. The Court has
never insisted on precise apportionment. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 3o8 U.S. 331
(1939). See Hellerstein and Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 949 (1941)29 See Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Col. L. Rev. 211

(i947).
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Judgments sustaining or invalidating state taxation of interstate commerce,
insofar as competitive advantages are destroyed or equalized by sales and use
taxes, are preventing the most economic distribution of resources. 30 Since 1938,
decisions in gross-receipts tax cases have purported to be based on analysis of
their effects on the flow of interstate commerce. Consequently, Congress, as a
body more suitably equipped to make comprehensive economic investigations
than the courts, and undoubtedly the holder of power to place its imprimatur on
even concededly discriminatory taxation of interstate commerce, 3' should formulate a national policy based on the conflicting demands of state revenue needs
and freedom of movement in interstate trade.
Torts-Negligence-Person Endangered by Own Negligence Liable to
Rescuer for Injuries Sustained in Rescue-[New York].-The defendant
parked her car on an incline without taking proper precautions to prevent its
movement. The plaintiff sustained personal injuries in rescuing the defendant
from the path of the automobile after she had walked in front of it and it started
to move. The jury found that the defendant's negligence in parking her car was
the direct cause of the injury and upon instruction of the court that it was the
duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the plaintiff, damages were awarded. On appeal, held, there is a legal as well as a moral
duty not to expose one's self to undue risk of injury, thereby causing another to
undertake a rescue which brings about an undue risk of injury to the other.
Carney v. Buyea.x
To permit recovery by a rescuer where the act of the rescued created the
danger, the principal case removes conceptual barriers hitherto preventing such
recovery, and employs the foreseeability test in a new fact situation.
While the law has not recognized any general duty to aid a person who is in
peril,2 it is well established that where the danger is created by the negligent
30 For a discussion of the economic effects of use tax incidence see Carlson, Interstate

Barrier Effects of the Use Tax, 8 Law &Contemp. Prob. 223

(941).

The many dicta and decisions to this effect have recently been reinforced in Prudential
Life Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), sustaining a South Carolina tax on foreign
insurance companies measured by business done within the state, regardless of interstate or
local character. No similar tax was required of South Carolina insurance companies. The plaintiff, citing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)
to urge protection of the commerce clause, obtained the Court's concession that the tax
discriminated against interstate commerce, but the Court upheld the tax on the authority of
the McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 33 (i945), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1015 (I945), which declares that
"continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest .......
' 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 902 (1946).
2Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, i6o N.E. 3oi (1928); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cappier,
66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281 (i9o3); Prosser, Torts 190-92 (194); 2 Rest., Torts § 314 (i934).
Contra: Dupue v. Flateau, ioo Minn. 299, iii N.W. i (1907); cf. L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks,
220 Ind. 86, 4o N. E. 2d 334 (1942). The last case, however, can be explained by the fact
that the plaintiff was an invitee on the defendant's property, and the defendant failed to halt
31

